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FRIEND, NOT FOE:
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
David Cortright, with Alistair Millar, Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf, George A.
Lopez, Kristen Wall, Eliot Fackler, and Joshua Weaver *

I NTRODUCTION
This paper examines the contradiction of counterterrorism measures
(CTMs) that hinder the work of countering terror. It is written from the
perspective of independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that seek
to advance economic development and prevent armed conflict, but whose work
is hindered by overly restrictive counterterrorism policies. The paper is based
on a series of workshops and consultations conducted over the course of three
years on behalf of the Dutch development agency Cordaid, based in The
Hague, in cooperation with the Fourth Freedom Forum, a private research
foundation based in Goshen, Indiana. The paper draws from the work of
dozens of civil society groups in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa and
is based on interviews and meetings with hundreds of representatives of civil
society organizations (CSOs), donor agencies, research centers, and
governments. It benefits especially from the work of CIVICUS based in South
Africa and the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law and the Charity and
Security Network based in Washington, D.C.
The paper begins with a critical examination of the impact of CTMs on
civil society development and peace building activities. It reviews the harmful
impact on charities of measures intended to prevent the financing of terrorism.
The paper concludes with a critique of overly repressive and militarized
counterterrorism strategies and identifies alternative policies based on
comprehensive approaches that are likely to be more effective in preventing
violent extremism and to which civil society can contribute constructively.
I.
R ESTRICTIONS ON C IVIL S OCIETY
In the name of fighting terrorism governments have curtailed political
freedoms and imposed restrictive measures against human rights defenders and
civil society activists in many countries. Repressive CTMs have undermined
civil liberties and contributed to a climate of suspicion and hostility toward
nongovernmental groups. Many of the organizations that work against violent
extremism by promoting human rights and sustainable development are
themselves being labeled extremist and are facing constraints on their ability to
operate. The positive work of civil society to alleviate social and political
marginalization helps to reduce grievances that can lead to political violence.
Measures taken in the name of counterterrorism that limit the political space of
such groups have the ironic result of inhibiting work on the ground to address
conditions that fuel terrorism.

238

239

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW

2012

In December 2009 the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights defenders reported “worrying trends” globally in the
stigmatization of human rights defenders and their “growing categorization as
‘terrorists,’ ‘enemies of the State’ or ‘political opponents.’”1
States
“systematically invoke national security and public safety to restrict the scope”
of civil society activities.2 In many countries special legislative and regulatory
measures have been used to crack down on NGOs and activists who criticize
government policies. These measures make it more difficult for civil society
actors to operate freely and effectively. Negative impacts have been especially
noticeable in conflict zones and among groups that challenge government
policies through their work in peace building, democratization, and human
rights. CTMs, counterinsurgency operations, emergency measures, and
repressive actions have combined, with the distinctions often blurred, to create
hardships for those who contest unequal power relations.
Governments have tightened controls over civil society groups by
imposing onerous registration requirements and in some cases denying
organizations the right to operate. CIVICUS reported in December 2010 a
pattern of “arbitrary denials of registration for many organizations” in the
Euro-Mediterranean region.3 Governments have established new requirements
for CSO reporting on finances, governance structures, and the identities of
partner organizations and clients.4 In some countries fear-based rhetoric has
had a chilling effect that hinders the operational freedom of nongovernmental
groups.
In the United States laws against “material support” for terrorism
prohibit aiding or engaging with groups that are designated as “foreign terrorist
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
* This paper is the result of a collaborative research project of the Fourth Freedom Forum,
the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, and the
Dutch development agency Cordaid. It is based on findings from four international
conferences and interviews with dozens of representatives from civil society organizations,
research groups, universities and government offices across the world. The principal author is
David Cortright, Chair of the Board of the Fourth Freedom Forum and Director of Policy
Studies at the Kroc Institute. Cortright has written widely on ending the war in Afghanistan,
nonviolent social change, nuclear disarmament, and the use of multilateral sanctions and
incentives as tools of international peacemaking. He is the author or editor of 17 books, most
recently Ending Obama's War (Paradigm, 2011) and Towards Nuclear Zero (Routledge, IISS,
2010) and is the editor of Peace Policy, Kroc's online journal.
1
See Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, U.N. Human Rights Council, ¶ 27,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/22, (Dec. 30, 2009) (by Margaret Sekaggya).
2
See id. ¶ 32.
3
See MANDEEP TIWANA & NETSANET BELAY, CIVICUS, CIVIL SOCIETY: THE
CLAMPDOWN IS REAL 6 (Dec. 2010), available at https://www.civicus.org/content/CIVICUSGlobal_trends_in_Civil_Society_ Space_ 2009-2010.pdf.
4
See Mark Sidel, Counter-Terrorism and the Enabling Legal and Political Environment
for Civil Society: A Comparative Analysis of “War on Terror” States, 10 INT’L J. NOT-FORPROFIT L. 7, 10 (2008).
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organizations.”5 Under Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,6 charities could
be convicted under the law for providing “material support” to a group that the
government determines has diverted funds for terrorist purposes, even if the
group in question has not been officially designated as terrorist-related and the
charity has no knowledge of or intent to support the alleged diversion.7 Such
an expansive definition of “material support” creates legal jeopardy for
organizations involved in humanitarian assistance and conflict mediation
efforts. It places roadblocks in the way of delivering aid to designated groups
or the communities they control.8
In a number of countries, the creation of special security forces and
intensified operations against insurgents and alleged criminals and terrorists
have led to a sharp rise in the number of extrajudicial killings and abductions
of human rights workers and political activists. The Commonwealth Human
Rights Initiative expressed concern in 2009 that human rights defenders are
“being spied on or defamed . . . or being subject to arbitrary arrest, physical
violence and death.”9 The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights noted in
September 2010 that “human rights defenders, journalists, and civil society
activists in all regions of the world face threats to their lives and security
because of their work.”10
Counterterrorism measures are usually weighted toward the executive
branch of government, with little attention to enhancing judicial independence,
legislative oversight, and citizen involvement. Emergency measures passed in
the name of fighting terrorism have had the effect of undermining civil
liberties, restricting the ability of civil society groups to operate, and impeding
development and relief activities in marginalized communities. Repressive
CTMs have reversed progress achieved in recent years toward the integration
of human rights and accountable governance into development policy.
Individual rights and political freedoms have eroded as states have
accumulated greater security powers.
An overemphasis on security measures may be contributing to a
general erosion of civil liberties and human rights. The nongovernmental
monitoring organization Freedom House has reported an alarming erosion of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5

See U.S. Congressional Research Service. “Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of
18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B,” (R41333; July 19, 2010) by Charles Doyle.
6
See 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
7
See id. at 2717.
8
See OXFAM, WHOSE AID IS IT ANYWAY?: POLITICIZING AID IN CONFLICTS AND CRISES,
BRIEFING
PAPER
N O.
145,
21
(2011),
available
at
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp145-whose-aid-anyway-100211-en_0.pdf.
9
COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE, SILENCING THE DEFENDERS: HUMAN
RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN THE COMMONWEALTH 18 (Maja Daruwala ed., 2009) available at
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/chogm/chogm_2009/silencing_the_defende
rs_chogm_2009_report.pdf.
10
Navanethem Pillay, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Opening Statement at
Human
Rights
Council
15th
Sess.,
(Sept.
13,
2010),
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Display News.aspx?NewsID=10319&LangID=e.
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global political freedom in recent years. In its 2010 annual survey the
organization noted “intensified repression against human rights defenders and
civic activists” and reported declines for political freedom in forty countries
representing twenty percent of the world’s total polities.11 The last few years
have witnessed the longest continuous period of decline for global freedom in
the organization’s nearly forty year history of publishing annual ratings.12 In
2011, Freedom House noted a further decline in political freedom and a
reduction in the number of countries defined as politically free. The report
highlighted the continued poor performance of countries in the Middle East
and North Africa, although this trend may be partially reversed if the
democratic revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia produce freer societies and more
representative governments. The Freedom House report does not link the
erosion of liberty to counterterrorism policies. It makes no attempt to attribute
the observed pattern to any particular policy development, but it is at least
plausible that the global trend toward restrictive CTMs and tighter controls on
civil society actors may be contributing to the global decline of political
freedom.
II.
G ENDER I MPACTS
Women suffer directly from counterterrorism pressures when they are
unlawfully detained or ill-treated to gain information about a male family
member. They often face harassment because of their attempts to win freedom
for those imprisoned men or gain information about the disappeared. As noted
by the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances,
women are often at the forefront of efforts to resolve abductions and
deportations of family members, and as a result they are themselves
“susceptible to intimidation, persecution and reprisals.”13
Extremist groups have targeted women by restricting their public
mobility and imposing harsh codes of behavior in the regions they control.
Women faced restrictions on their movement and participation in public life
during the period of Taliban rule in Afghanistan and still do today in some
communities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The West’s support of women’s
rights in Afghanistan since 2001 has created a backlash against Afghan
women’s rights defenders. In Afghanistan, as in other countries, human rights
defenders are often caught between militant group pressures and government
counterterrorism measures.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11

See Freedom in the World 2010: Global Erosion of Freedom, FREEDOM HOUSE,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/freedom-world-2010-global-erosion-freedom,
(last
visited Feb. 22, 2012).
12
See id.
13
See HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF ALL HUMAN RIGHTS,
CIVIL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO
DEVELOPMENT, REP. OF THE WORKING GROUP ON ENFORCED AND INVOLUNTARY
DISAPPEARANCES, A/HRC/10/9, Feb. 25, 2009, ¶ 455, available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/111/84/PDF/ G0911184.pdf?OpenElement.
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Abusive interrogation methods have a gendered dimension. At Abu
Ghraib and other prisons, US contractors and soldiers manipulated gender and
cultural stereotypes as a means of coercive interrogation, including the use of
female interrogators to torment and question naked male Arab prisoners. In
some countries!that are allies of the United States!where prisoners are
rendered, officials have resorted to the threat or use of violence and sexual
abuse against prisoners and their relatives as a means of extracting
information. In the United States and other countries hyper-masculine imagery
and language may play a role in motivating overly aggressive military and
counterterrorism actions.14
In some countries women who wear visible religious garb are subjected
to discrimination and profiling. France has banned the wearing of the hijab in
schools, and government officials in other countries have adopted or are
considering similar measures to restrict the wearing of religious clothing and
symbols in public places.15 Political and social pressures against Muslim
immigrants have increased in Europe and other regions in recent years. So
have misconceptions and stereotypes falsely equating the wearing of the hijab
with terrorist sympathies. In some instances, anti-terrorism posters have
included images of veiled women.16 Populist politicians have exploited such
distortions to fan the flames of intolerance and gain electoral advantages. As a
result, Muslim women are often stigmatized for following their religious and
cultural traditions. This can generate feelings of humiliation and anger among
the affected women and their family members and may exacerbate tensions
between social communities.
Women have important contributions to make in combating violent
extremism. In some of the world’s most dangerous settings they have proven
to be courageous and effective advocates for peace. Yet women often are not
heard or adequately represented in policy-making bodies. The denial of
women’s voices in counterterrorism policy is contrary to the intent of UN
Security Council Resolution 1325 and related measures, including Resolution
1960 (2010), which emphasized the importance of female participation in
conflict prevention and peacemaking. The active involvement of women is
essential to the crafting of effective and balanced means of countering armed
violence.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14

See The United States and Gender, National Security and Counterterrorism Concept
Note, N.Y.U. CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. & GLOBAL JUSTICE, April 14, 2010,
http://www.chrgj.org/projects/docs/ConceptNote.pdf.
15
See BBC News, The Islamic Veil Across Europe (Sept. 22, 2011, updated June 15,
2010), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/5414098.stm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
16
See Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering
Terrorism, G.A. Res. A/61/267, U.N. Doc. A/61/267 para. 38–39 (Aug. 16, 2006), available at
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/477/03/PDF/N0647703.pdf?OpenElement (last visited Mar.
25, 2012).
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III.

S ECURITIZING A ID
The recent global focus on counterterrorism and multilateral
counterinsurgency operations has accelerated a trend toward using aid and
development funding for security-related purposes.
This approach subordinates traditional goals of mitigating poverty to
the agenda of counterterrorism and defeating insurgency. It blurs the analytic
boundaries between security and development while politicizing both and
detracting from efforts to improve the lives of the world’s most disadvantaged
communities.
The process works in two ways: a growing proportion of aid funding is
channeled directly through military institutions, and development programs are
increasingly implemented in support of military operations. The percentage of
US aid funding allocated through the Pentagon has increased in recent years
from 3.5% in 1998 to approximately 25% ten years later.17 Aid budgets have
increased around the world, but two-fifths of the increase since 2002 has gone
to just two countries—Iraq and Afghanistan.18 Major recipients of US
development assistance are countries central to security and counterterrorism
objectives. In some of the countries where foreign assistance is provided,
police forces are highly repressive and unaccountable. Assistance provided to
such forces in the absence of needed structural reforms may simply reinforce
repressive tendencies and undermine civil society efforts to defend human
rights and establish democratic oversight.19
In October 2010, the British Department for International Development
announced a 35% increase in development funding over a four year period,
with a major boost in spending in countries affected by conflict, especially
Afghanistan and Pakistan.20 Over the four year period, funding to support
overseas development in fragile and conflict-affected states will increase from
22% to 30%.21 British development advocates welcomed the increased
commitment to development assistance but questioned the greater
prioritization of security concerns. Labor Member of Parliament (MP) Joan
Ruddock asked how the aid budget would be able to maintain its focus on
helping women and children and reducing poverty if a third of the budget is

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17

See Stewart Patrick & Kaysie Brown, The Pentagon and Global Development: Making
Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role 1, 4 (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 131, 2007);
see also Amy B. Frumin, Equipping USAID for Success: A Field Perspective, PCR Special
project briefing, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDS. (June 2009).
18
See OXFAM, supra note 8, at 2, 9.
19
See Alice Hills, Trojan Horses? USAID, Counter-terrorism and Africa's Police, 27
THIRD WORLD Q. 629, 630 (2006).
20
See Spending Review 2010: Press Release, UNITED KINGDOM DEPARTMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (Oct. 20, 2010), available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/MediaRoom/Press-releases/2010/ Spending-Review-2010/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
21
See id.
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reallocated to conflict zones.22 Similarly, one aid group said, “[a]id money
should go toward poor nations rather than countries that present a security
threat.”23
In a February 2011 report, Oxfam argued that aid is being politicized to
the detriment of people with the greatest need.24 The report provides that
“lifesaving humanitarian assistance and long-term efforts to reduce poverty are
being damaged where aid is used primarily to pursue donors’ own narrow
political and security objectives.”25 While huge sums are devoted to countries
where Western nations have direct security interests, “equally poor and
conflict-afflicted countries from the Democratic Republic of Congo to the
Central African Republic have received far smaller shares of aid relative to
their needs.”26 Aid provided through a security lens overlooks the plight of
some of the world’s most marginalized populations.27
The securitization of aid has generated deep concerns in the
development community.28 Development advocates have sought to shield aid
programs from military encroachments, even as they recognize the deep and
inexorable connections that exist between development and security.29
Accepting the need for a more integrated and coherent approach to
development and security does not justify the “slow bleeding of financing for
development purposes into security-related military activities,” declared a
report for CIDSE, the coalition of Catholic development agencies in Europe
and North America.30 Nor does it mean that all development and security
goals are compatible. The Association of World Council of Churches-related
Development Organizations in Europe (APRODEV) acknowledged that
development can contribute to security, but only if the integrity and autonomy
of development activities are respected fully.31
Faith-based aid agencies emphasize their commitment to the
preferential option for the poor and the powerless, and to the vision of a more
just and peaceful world.32 They support a holistic human security strategy that
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22

See Nicholas Watt, Anger as Billions in Aid is Diverted to War Zones, THE GUARDIAN
(Oct. 19, 2010, 9:44 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/oct/19/aid-billionsdiverted-to-war-zones?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter.
23
Ivy Mungcal, Praise and Criticism Greet UK Foreign Aid Budget Increase, DEVEX
(Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.devex.com/en/blogs/the-global-development-briefing/top-story-ofthe-week-cheers-and-jeers-for-uk-foreign-aid-budget-increase.
24
See OXFAM, supra note 8, at 1.
25
Id. at 2.
26
Id. at 9.
27
Id. at 18.
28
See COOPÉRATION INTERNATIONALE POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT ET LA SOLIDARITÉ,
CIDSE STUDY ON SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT 19 (2006).
29
See id.
30
See id.
31
See Clive Robinson, Whose Security? Integration and Integrity in EU Policies for
Security and Development, in NEW INTERFACES BETWEEN SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT:
CHANGING CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES 69, 81 (Stephan Klingebiel ed., 2006).
32
See id., at 69–70.
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prioritizes the well-being of individuals and communities rather than a narrow
approach that protects the interests of states.33 They argue that human rights
and development should be seen as ends in themselves, not as means to other
purposes.34 Development cooperation should not be subsumed to an idea of
security based on defending the interests and preserving the way of life of
states in the global North.35 Peace cannot be imposed “from above.”36 For
peace to be sustainable, it must grow “from below.”37
IV.
M ONEY AS A W EAPONS S YSTEM
The development aid that is provided in Afghanistan and other war
zones is not for the purpose of alleviating poverty and supporting long-term
sustainability. Its strategic objective is to gain the sympathy of local
populations and win political support for military missions. Aid programs
from the US and other NATO countries generally flow to regions and
communities where military and counterterrorism operations are taking place.
In Afghanistan funding is concentrated in southern provinces where insurgency
and counterinsurgency are most prevalent, while other previously less
turbulent parts of the country receive fewer development resources. US
military leaders are explicit in describing development assistance as an element
of war. A US Army manual for Iraq and Afghanistan was entitled “A
Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System.” It described aid as “a
nonlethal weapon”38 utilized to “win the hearts and minds of the indigenous
population to facilitate defeating the insurgents.”39
US and allied military forces have established Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as a major vehicle for providing humanitarian
and development assistance in both Afghanistan and, previously, in Iraq.
PRTs have been criticized by development experts as “overwhelmingly
military in scope and operation,” with a primary focus on force protection and
security assistance. Problems identified with the PRTs include “generally poor
development practice” and “relative lack of attention to promoting good
governance and the rule of law.”40 A subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee in the US Congress reported that PRTs tend to pursue
“short-term, ‘feelgood’ projects . . . without consideration of larger strategic
and capacity-building implications.”41 A January 2010 report by seven
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33

See id.
Id.
35
Id. at 75.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED, US ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER,
COMMANDERS’ GUIDE TO MONEY AS A WEAPONS SYSTEM: TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND
PROCEDURES 13 (2009), available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/09-27/09-27.pdf.
39
Id. at 1.
40
Patrick & Brown, supra note 17, at 5–6.
41
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMM. ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, AGENCY STOVEPIPES VERSUS STRATEGIC AGILITY: LESSONS
34
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humanitarian agencies in Afghanistan argued that PRTs often “lack the
capacity to manage effective development initiatives.”42 In many cases, PRTs
rely on wasteful and corrupt contractors with limited capacities and have weak
links to local communities.43 PRTs are unable to gain the trust of local
populations and thus cannot foster the sense of community ownership and local
empowerment that are needed to achieve sustainable development. Many
Afghans are afraid to work with the PRTs for fear of insurgent attacks directed
against these foreign-run military institutions.44
The US military has also established the Commander’s Emergency
Response Program (CERP), which allows field commanders to dispense
payments of tens of thousands of dollars or more on projects intended to
generate goodwill among local populations. CERP spending in Afghanistan
increased sharply over the years, from $40 million in 2004 to $1 billion in
2010.45 The program has been criticized by the US Government Accountability
Office for a lack of management and oversight and for the absence of metrics
for evaluating the impact of local projects.46 A report of the Committee on
Appropriations of the US House of Representatives described CERP as a
program with “few limits and little management.”47
Military forces are not appropriate providers of development assistance.
Military service members do not have the mandate and are not trained or
equipped to address problems of “underdevelopment, alienation, and
instability” in marginalized communities.48 “Few soldiers possess [the needed]
expertise in matters of governance, development, and the rule of law.”49
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
WE NEED TO LEARN FROM PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

72
(2008), available at https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/SCDSM/Links/Forms/PRT_Report.
42
ACTION AID ET AL., QUICK IMPACT, QUICK COLLAPSE: THE DANGERS OF MILITARIZED
AID
IN
AFGHANISTAN
1
(2010),
available
at
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/quick-impact-quick-collapse-jan-2010.pdf.
The seven organizations contributing to this report include ActionAid, Afghanaid, CARE,
Christian Aid, Concern, Oxfam, and Trócaire.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 3.
45
Frank Oliveri & Emily Cadei, Afghanistan: Mission Uncertain, 2010 CQ WEEKLY
2382, available at http://library.cqpress.com.proxy.library.nd.edu/cqweekly/weeklyreport111000003752697.
46
US GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-736R, MILITARY OPERATIONS: ACTIONS
NEEDED TO BETTER GUIDE PROJECT SELECTION FOR COMMANDER’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE
PROGRAM
AND
IMPROVE
OVERSIGHT
IN
IRAQ
(2008),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08736r.pdf; US GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09615, MILITARY OPERATIONS: ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT AND INTERAGENCY
COORDINATION FOR THE COMMANDER’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM IN AFGHANISTAN
(2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09615.pdf.
47
H.R. REP. NO. 111-230, pt. 9, at 349 (2010), reprinted in 2010 USCCAN 2487,
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?&report=hr230&dbname=111&.
48
Patrick & Brown, supra note 17, at 12.
49
See Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, “The Pentagon and Global Development:
Making Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role,” Center for Global Development Working Paper
131, November 2007, 12.
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Assigning these tasks to military rather than civilian actors displaces the role of
civil society and undermines the principles of local self-reliance and grassroots
empowerment that are vital to genuine development and democratic
governance.
The January 2010 report by humanitarian agencies in Afghanistan
summarized the dire consequences of militarizing aid:
More and more assistance is being channeled through military
actors to “win hearts and minds” while efforts to address the
underlying causes of poverty and repair the destruction wrought
by three decades of conflict and disorder are being sidelined.
Development projects implemented with military money or
through military-dominated structures aim to achieve fast
results but are often poorly executed, inappropriate[,] and do not
have sufficient community involvement to make them
sustainable. There is little evidence this approach is generating
stability and, in some cases, military involvement in
development activities is, paradoxically, putting Afghan lives
further at risk as these projects quickly become targeted by antigovernment elements.50
Direct attacks on aid workers have increased in recent years. A
comprehensive database maintained by US, Canadian and Irish government
agencies shows a pattern of increased attacks on aid workers: total aid worker
victims, including those killed, kidnapped, or injured, was 242 in 2010,
compared to eighty-five in 2002.51 The trend reflects a greater number of aid
workers operating in insecure areas, but also results from an apparent rise in
politically motivated attacks, which account for nearly half the total.52
The Director of Operations for the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) warned recently that linking humanitarian action and security
operations endangers aid agencies and diminishes their ability to serve
populations in need.53 Subordinating humanitarian assistance to military
purposes is a violation of the ICRC Code of Conduct, which provides for a
strict separation of humanitarian assistance from any military or political
agenda.54 Separation is necessary to safeguard aid workers and the
communities they serve and to uphold the principle of prioritizing
humanitarian assistance according to need.55
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50

ACTION AID ET AL., supra note 42, at 1.
Major Attacks on Aid Workers: Summary Statistics (2000–2010), THE AID WORKER
SECURITY
DATABASE,
HUMANITARIAN
OUTCOMES
(Feb.
5,
2012),
https://aidworkersecurity.org/incidents/report/ summary.
52
OXFAM, supra note 8, at 20.
53
See Pierre Krähenbühl, The Militarization of Aid is Perilous, STARS AND STRIPES, Jan.
15, 2011; The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
and
NGOs
in
Disaster
Relief
(Geneva:
ICRC,
1994),
available
at
www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/code-of-conduct-290296.
54
Id.
55
Id.
51
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V.

T ARGETING C HARITIES
Tighter restrictions on international financial transactions are a central
element of international counterterrorism policy. The intended purpose is to
prevent the financing of terrorism, but these measures have the effect of
hindering the work of foundations, nongovernmental groups, and charitable
agencies that support humanitarian and peacemaking activities.56 Some donors
have become risk averse and reluctant to fund initiatives that address
controversial issues or challenge inequalities. The new rules have had a
chilling effect on donors and charities, and have left vulnerable populations
underserved. Allegations of wrongdoing and restrictions on nonprofit
financing have eroded trust and cooperative relations between donors and
overseas partners in many countries.57 They have created a “cloud of
suspicion” over the entire nonprofit sector.58
Islamic NGOs have experienced particular difficulties because of
CTMs and tighter restrictions on transnational funding. The Oxford-based
International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC) has reported that
Muslim NGOs “in the USA and elsewhere . . . are finding it harder to raise
funds” and fulfill their religious duty of almsgiving, the Zak!t, which is one of
the five pillars of Islam.59 Since 2001, three of the largest Islamic
organizations in the US—the Holy Land Foundation, Global Relief
Foundation, and Benevolence International Foundation—have had their assets
frozen.60 Muslim charities and trusts in the UK also have been exposed to high
levels of scrutiny under anti-terror legislation. The overall effect of such
measures is a decline in giving to Islamic charities and challenges to the
religious obligation to serve the needy.61
The targeting of civil society financing is rooted in the Special
Recommendations against the Financing of Terrorism issued by the Financial
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Action Task Force (FATF).62 Recommendation VIII instructs governments
and financial institutions to “ensure that nonprofit organizations cannot be
misused to finance terrorism.”63 In its Interpretive Note on Recommendation
VIII, FATF claims, without supportive evidence, that nonprofit organizations
are vulnerable to terrorist group manipulation and exploitation.64
Officials of foundations and charitable funding agencies contest these
claims and refute assertions that charities are a significant source of funding
for terrorist organizations. Rob Buchanan, Managing Director of International
Programs at the US Council on Foundations, stated in a March 2009
presentation in Washington, D.C. that there is no evidence of US charitable
funds falling into the hands of al-Qaida or other global terrorist groups.65 Of
the 1.8 million charitable organizations in the United States, Buchanan noted,
only a handful have been alleged to have links with terrorism financing. To
date, the Treasury Department has designated eight US charities for alleged
terrorist financing, only four of these for connections to al-Qaida.66 The most
recent Treasury designations of US charities have been for alleged support of
Hezbollah and Tamil organizations. No claims of US charitable support for alQaida have been registered since 2004.67
The Office of Foreign Assets Control of the US Treasury Department
has established a Risk Matrix that stigmatizes and labels as “high risk” any
charity that “engages in work in conflict zones or in countries/regions known
to have a concentration of terrorist activity.”68 USAID has established a
requirement dating from 2002 that all grantees obtain a worldwide AntiTerrorism Certification, dissociating themselves from dealings with any entity
designated by the US government as terrorist-related.69 Prohibitions on
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engaging with armed actors have led to reduced support for track two
diplomacy and informal peace processes in conflict zones.70
In the United States, laws against “material support” for terrorism
prohibit aiding or engaging with groups that are designated as “foreign terrorist
organizations.”71 Under the Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project ruling of
2010,72 charities risk prosecution if they provide “material support” to a group
that the government determines has diverted funds for terrorist purposes, even
if the group in question has not been officially designated as terrorist-related
and the charity has no knowledge of or intent to support the alleged
diversion.73 Material support can be defined to include any form of
engagement with designated individuals or entities designated as “terrorist” or
“terrorist-supporting.” Such an expansive definition of “material support”
creates legal jeopardy for organizations involved in humanitarian assistance
and conflict mediation efforts. It outlaws engaging with armed actors to
facilitate conflict resolution. It places roadblocks in the way of delivering aid
to designated groups or the communities they control.74
In several countries, governments have adopted legislation and
implemented regulations curbing remittances and imposing conditions on
foreign funding. In Bangladesh, the government notified NGOs that at least
half of all foreign grants must be spent on visible development projects such as
roads and canals. In Jordan, government approval is needed to receive foreign
funds.75 In some countries local groups are required to raise “counterpart
funds” to match a percentage of the funding offered from external sources, a
condition that is difficult to meet in low-income countries. Hardest hit by such
restrictions are communities in war-torn areas that depend upon the support of
charitable agencies and funding from Diasporas and external donors.76
VI.
C OOPTION OR P ARTNERSHIP ?
The US government has attempted to enlist foundations and charities in
its war on terror. The Treasury Department’s Anti-Terrorist Financing
Guidelines calls upon charities to collect information about their grantees, to
investigate possible links with terrorism, and to report “suspicious
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information” to the Treasury Department or the FBI.77 Foundation executives
are highly critical of such provisions and have described them as “useless and
embarrassing, damaging trust . . . with the very groups that could make a
difference” in addressing conditions that lead to terrorism.78 Requiring
nonprofit groups to collect personal information on their partners puts them at
risk of being perceived as law enforcement or intelligence agents. It attempts
to turn philanthropists into spies.
A coalition of more than seventy US nonprofit agencies, led by the
Council on Foundations, attempted for more than seven years to persuade
Treasury officials to change the guidelines, without success. In November
2010, the coalition called off the talks and criticized the government for its
“unwillingness to make any substantive changes to its approach—or to
recognize the important role of global philanthropy in increasing national
security through funding to address poverty, inequality, disease, and other
pressing needs.” The coalition has called for the withdrawal of the Guidelines
and their replacement by the “Principles of International Charity” adopted
voluntarily by the nonprofit sector in 2005 as an alternative means of assuring
accountability.79
Charitable agencies have also sharply criticized USAID’s proposed
Partner Vetting System (PVS), which would require all USAID grant
applicants to submit detailed personal information on key individuals within
partner organizations. The information could be shared with intelligence
agencies in the event of a “risk to national security,” which is not defined. If
implemented PVS would impose new data collection obligations on charities
and divert staff and funding from grant making. It would compromise the
independence of nonprofits operating in conflict zones and further endanger
aid workers and their local partners. A major health care NGO warned that the
new procedures “can only serve to incite animus and increase the likelihood of
attacks” against donor agencies and their partners.80 As of this writing the
PVS proposal has not yet been implemented, but USAID is proceeding with
preparations for its introduction.
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While many States follow the US model of establishing onerous vetting
and registration requirements on charities, some governments take a more
cooperative approach to addressing the risks of terrorist financing. The
European Commission has issued guidelines and a draft code of conduct for
engaging with civil society groups.81 The EU Justice and Home Affairs
Council seeks to safeguard the integrity of the nonprofit sector and assure
greater dialogue among States, civil society groups, and relevant stakeholders.
Accountability and transparency are “at the heart of donor confidence,”
according to the Justice and Home Affairs Council. The challenge of
preventing terrorist finance requires “effective, proportionate measures of
oversight,” which are best achieved through cooperation rather than
accusation.82
The recent World Bank study on nonprofit organizations questioned
whether government regulation is the best way of preventing the diversion of
charitable funding to terrorist purposes. It noted the existence of self-regulatory
mechanisms within the nonprofit sector that have the force of contract and can
impose penalties on organizations that violate the law and agreed codes of
conduct. Because they cannot succeed without public trust, nonprofit agencies
are subject to peer pressure and have strong incentives to eliminate fraud and
abuse within their sector. The World Bank study urges governments to
“recognize the need felt in the sector to demonstrate its good governance . . .
and use that aspiration to also address terrorism financing concerns,” allowing
nonprofits to take ownership of the problem through greater transparency.83
VII. H OW ( NOT ) TO P REVENT T ERRORISM
Restrictions on civil society organizations and charities are rooted in a
“war on terror” approach to preventing violent extremism. Since 2001, the
United States has relied primarily on militarized policies in its attempts to
suppress al Qaida and prevent future terrorist attacks. The Obama
administration has discontinued war-on-terror rhetoric and banned the use of
torture, but U.S. policies remain heavily militarized, and have become more so
with recent troop increases in Afghanistan and the increasing use of drone
strikes and cross border special forces operations in Pakistan. In the global
fight against terrorism, the United States continues to rely on policies of
targeted killing, lawless apprehension, rendition, warrantless surveillance, and
indefinite detention. The language is changed but the means are the same; a
war on terror by another name.
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An over-reliance on military force is an inappropriate and ineffective
strategy for countering terrorism. A 2008 RAND Corporation study, How
Terrorist Groups End, shows that terrorist groups usually end through political
processes and effective law enforcement, not the use of military force. An
examination of 268 terrorist organizations that ended during a period of nearly
forty years found that the primary factors accounting for their demise were
participation in political processes (43 percent) and effective policing (40
percent). Military force accounted for the end of terrorist groups in only 7
percent of the cases examined. Terrorist groups end most often when they trade
bombs for ballots and join a political process, or when they are suppressed by
local law enforcement agencies. Policing works best when law enforcement
officials are rooted in local communities, and have the confidence and trust of
local residents that enables them to penetrate criminal networks.84
War policies are not only inappropriate, they are counterproductive.
When Western nations invade and occupy Muslim countries, this has the
unintended effect of validating the ideology of extremists who claim to be
saving Islam from foreign infidels. Polls in Muslim countries have shown 80
percent agreement with the view that Western military interventions are
directed against Islamic society; that they are at war against Islam itself.85 As
long as these attitudes prevail there will be no end of recruits willing to blow
themselves up to kill foreign troops and their supporters.
Most governments and international officials have emphasized the
necessity of cooperative law enforcement to counter transnational terrorism.
Especially effective are programs that emphasize community policing and
respect for the rule of law and the rights of citizens. International police
cooperation and intelligence sharing have been successful in thwarting attacks,
perhaps most dramatically in foiling an alleged plot to bomb flights from
London to the United States in August 2006.86 The head of the Crown
Prosecution Service in the United Kingdom said, “The fight against terrorism
on the streets of Britain is not a war. It is the prevention of crime, the
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enforcement of our laws and the winning of justice for those damaged by their
infringement.”87
VIII. A H OLISTIC S TRATEGY A GAINST V IOLENT E XTREMISM
Security protections are necessary but not sufficient to the strategy of
preventing violent extremism and countering global terrorist threats.88 A
comprehensive approach is needed that balances security with the rule of law
and the defense of human rights. In his March 2005 report, In Larger
Freedom, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan emphasized the need for a
holistic strategy: “[D]evelopment, security, and human rights go hand in hand.
. . . we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security
without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human
rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed.”89
In 2006 the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy that embodies Annan’s call for a more
comprehensive and integrated approach. The Strategy transcends the narrow
security-oriented focus of earlier Security Council resolutions and links the
struggle against terrorism to a broader set of principles for avoiding violent
conflict through development, democracy, and diplomacy. The Strategy
identifies four pillars of international policy:
I. Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of
terrorism;90
II. Measures to prevent and combat terrorism;91
III. Measures to build States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and
to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard;92 and
IV. Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law
as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.93
It is significant that the first of the pillars focuses on conditions
conducive to the spread of terrorism. This places the primary emphasis on
efforts to advance development and good governance, not on security
measures. The Strategy defines “conditions conducive” as “prolonged
unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism in all its forms
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and manifestations, lack of rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic,
national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic
marginalization, and lack of good governance.”94 The way to fight terrorism,
according to the Strategy, is not only to enhance security, through such
measures as improving border controls, but to adopt preventive measures such
as resolving conflict, ending foreign occupation, overcoming oppression,
eradicating poverty, and promoting sustainable economic development and
good governance.95 The Strategy notes that success in realizing development
objectives and improving human rights and governance, “could reduce
marginalization and the subsequent sense of victimization that propels
extremism and the recruitment of terrorists.”96
The UN Strategy is important because it helps to shift the focus of
international policy away from a narrow focus on security toward a more
comprehensive approach that prioritizes development, human rights, and
democratic governance. Because it is approved by all UN member states, the
Strategy has enormous political legitimacy. It gives prominence to conflict
prevention rather than security protection. Pillar I pays specific attention to the
advancement of development, while Pillar IV emphasizes the promotion of
human rights and the rule of law. The protection of human rights cuts across
all four pillars of the Strategy with the instruction “that States must ensure that
any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under
international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international
humanitarian law.”97 The Strategy provides opportunities for promoting these
goals through the cooperation of states and the support of multiple
stakeholders, including specific mention of civil society as having an important
role to play when implementing the strategy.
Civil society groups play an indispensable role in advancing human
rights. Repressive governments by their very nature lack effective mechanisms
for considering these issues. They are loath to consider policy changes that
can lead to more representative governance and greater economic and political
equity. These are precisely the areas where CSOs can be most helpful.
Development and human rights groups can prevent violent extremism by
pursuing their core mission of rights-based development. The nonprofit sector
of a country is a force for good, according to the World Bank study; it should
be “protected, rather than unnecessarily curtailed.”98
Through their efforts for development, conflict transformation, and
human rights, civil society groups are working to dry up the wells of
extremism from which violence springs. Civic organizations address political
grievances, socio-economic injustices, and power imbalances that are among
the roots causes of armed conflict. This work is not labeled counterterrorism,
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nor should it be, but it is exactly what is needed to counter violent extremism.
International policymakers must recognize and protect this vital civil society
mission and take action to eliminate counterproductive CTMs. In the global
struggle against terrorism civil society groups should be welcomed as friends,
not hounded as foes.
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